This article reviews a recently published research paper, “Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought.” Federalism has been hotly debated this year and the meaning of the word is often contested or misunderstood.

When historian Douglas H. Johnson delivered a lecture at the University of Juba on 5 July 2014 on the history of federalism in South Sudan, Central Equatoria State was in the midst of a political crisis.

Just two days before, the governor of the state had delivered a searing speech accusing national authorities of disarming troops from his region and trying to pressure him to retract his demand for the adoption of a federal system. There were rumors that the governor was mobilizing a militia to battle national authorities and reports that the army had dispatched forces to the governor’s hometown.

Though the crisis was eventually diffused, the political differences that had sparked it remained unresolved.

An essay published last month by the Rift Valley Institute is adapted from the lecture delivered by Dr. Johnson at the time of that crisis. The roughly 20-page booklet recounts the history of the idea of federalism within the united Sudan, and later within the independent South Sudan.

Johnson’s work is based on original research and historical documents, referring to the ideas and experiences of prominent South Sudanese intellectuals and politicians such as Aggrey Jaden, William Deng, Buth Diu, and Ezboni Mundiri.

His history covers several different eras since the mid-20th century, including the important Nimeiri-era precedent of the Southern Regional Government, its later abolishment, and its further re-division into three smaller regions in 1983.

Two decades of war that followed this move repudiated the Khartoum national government’s domination over the Southern region. But as Johnson points out, after the guerilla SPLM took power in the South in 2005, they developed Juba into a “central power” akin to Khartoum, leaving little power in the hands of state governments.

“In principle, southern Sudanese rejected Khartoum’s version of federation when they voted for independence. In practice, they inherited Khartoum’s division of the south into ten states, with Juba replacing Khartoum as the central power: in other words, they inherited ‘decentralization’ rather than federation,” writes Johnson.

Johnson’s insights and commentary on the political discourse of 2014 are also noteworthy. For instance, he likens a recent SPLM-IO proposal to divide South Sudan into 21 states to the ‘Ethnic Federalism’ practiced in Ethiopia. He argues that the proposal “threatens to take the Ethiopian example to the extreme, creating weak states unable to challenge or restrain whoever holds power in the federal government.”

“The problem with Ethiopian federalism is not that it is insufficiently ethnic, but that it is insufficiently federal.”

SPLM-IO’s proposal differs from that of the Equatorian federalists, who want to preserve and indeed strengthen the existing states rather than divide them. This form of federalism aims to devolve powers from the national government in Juba and give more autonomy and power to state governors and legislatures.

However, Johnson questions whether all of the so-called federalists in Equatoria want “genuine federalism,” dismissing some as mere “advocates of the new Kokora.” This term, a Bari word meaning ‘division,’ refers to the 1983 re-division of South Sudan, but also is associated with ethnic ideas including “anti-Dinka propaganda.”

“Let us be clear: Kokora is not the same as federalism. It did not create a federal state in Equatoria or any place else in southern Sudan. It weakened the powers of the regions while leaving the power of the central government in Khartoum untouched, enhanced even. Those who want genuine federalism are best advised not to adopt Kokora as their model,” writes Johnson.

This historical perspective on the current federalist movement in Equatoria helps explain the hostility of SPLM (Juba faction) to federalism as a system, given that the movement long suffered from factionalism. Core principles of federalism including separation of powers and shared sovereignty are opposed by many in the SPLM/A, which has long put a premium on loyalty to a centralized command and which since coming to power in South Sudan in 2005 has focused its efforts on building a unitary state.

The present political importance of this should not be overlooked; in spite of the party’s nominal assent to federalism in response to Equatorian demands, few if any of the ruling party leaders have spelled out what they mean by ‘federalism,’ and many remain suspicious of federalist ideas and committed to the development of a unitary state.

In light of this, Johnson’s study may have benefited from more discussion of how the political culture of SPLM shaped the current Transitional Constitution, which was drafted ahead of independence in 2011, and how it continues to shape discussions on constitutional questions at ongoing peace talks.

Many South Sudanese intellectuals have written in broad terms about the current Constitution – as to whether it is ‘authoritarian’ or not, for instance – but few have reflected deeply on the particularities of the South Sudanese constitutional system and hypothesized alternatives, in light of the present situation.

Johnson’s own discussion of this is fairly cursory – apparently intentionally so – but his conclusion nonetheless points to the importance of this line of inquiry. “Self- determination means more than choosing independence. It also means choosing a form of self-government, and that choice has still to be made,” he writes.

In all, this is a remarkably timely academic work that ought to help inform civic discourse among South Sudanese. It is available for download here.

File photo: Dr. Douglas H. Johnson delivers a lecture at Juba University

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